Violations of betweenness or random errors? by Blavatskyy, Pavlo R
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Year: 2006
Violations of betweenness or random errors?
Blavatskyy, P
Blavatskyy, P. Violations of betweenness or random errors? Economics Letters 2006, 91(1):34-38.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
Economics Letters 2006, 91(1):34-38
Blavatskyy, P. Violations of betweenness or random errors? Economics Letters 2006, 91(1):34-38.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
Economics Letters 2006, 91(1):34-38
Violations of betweenness or random errors?
Abstract
A betweenness axiom states that if A and B are equally good then a mixture of A and B is equally good
as well. This note demonstrates that the violations of the betweenness axiom documented in several
experimental studies can be alternatively attributed to the effect of random errors.
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Abstract: 
A betweenness axiom states that if A and B are equally good then a mixture of A and B is equally 
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Violations of betweenness or random errors? 
1. Introduction 
In choice under risk (e.g., Knight, 1921) a betweenness axiom states that if an individual 
is indifferent between two lotteries than a probability mixture of these two lotteries is equally 
good (e.g., Dekel, 1986). Apart from its normative appeal, betweenness axiom is attractive 
because it is compatible with the Allais paradox (e.g., Chew, 1983) and it is sufficient for 
proving the existence of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Crawford, 1990). This note reexamines the 
experimental methodology of several studies conducted in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s to 
test the descriptive validity of betweenness axiom. A casual survey of this literature suggests that 
betweenness is not a descriptive axiom. However, when this empirical evidence is thoroughly 
examined, a more favorable picture emerges.  
The literature on stochastic utility (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1998) reached a generic 
conclusion that some behavioral patterns, which appear as a systematic violation of a certain 
principle when taken at a face value, may actually support the principle once a stochastic 
specification is allowed. The present note demonstrates that this generic conclusion also applies 
to the case of betweenness. Section 2 reviews the alleged systematic violations of betweenness as 
documented in the existing experimental literature. In section 3, this evidence is reconciled with 
a stochastic version of betweenness i.e. when an individual obeys betweenness with an 
occasional random error. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental evidence on betweenness 
This section briefly summarizes ten well-known experimental studies conducted in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s that document an alleged systematic violation of betweenness. 
Coombs and Huang (1976) (experiment 1), Chew and Waller (1986), Camerer (1989), Battalio et 
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al. (1990), Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) (experiments 1 and 3) and Camerer and Ho (1994) all 
find that, on average, 68% of subjects respect betweenness. The remaining subjects are split 
between quasiconvex (i.e. they dislike randomization) and quasiconcave (i.e. they like 
randomization) preferences approximately in a non-corresponding proportion of 24% to 8%. 
This alleged systematic violation of betweenness emerges when some lotteries used in the 
experiment are located on the edges of the probability triangle (e.g., Machina, 1982). 
Coombs and Huang (1976) (experiment 2), Camerer (1992), Starmer (1992) and Gigliotti 
and Sopher (1993) (experiment 2) find that, on average, 76% of subjects respect betweenness 
and a split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is non-systematic (approximately 
in a non-corresponding proportion of 14% to 10%) when all of the lotteries used in the 
experiment are located inside the probability triangle. Additionally, Camerer and Ho (1994) find 
that the asymmetry of alleged betweenness violations disappears and Bernasconi (1994) finds 
that the number of betweenness violations decreases (though not their asymmetry) when a 
probability mixture of two lotteries is presented in a compound rather than a reduced form. 
Finally, Prelec (1990) finds that 76% of subjects reveal quasiconcave preferences and 
only 24% of subjects respect betweenness when probability mass of the hypothetical lotteries is 
largely shifted to the worst outcome. Camerer and Ho (1994) replicate this result for one lottery 
triple “TUV” in the experiment with real payoffs. Bernasconi (1994) documents a similar strong 
asymmetric violation of betweenness in two lottery pairs (1 and 3), where a modal choice pattern 
is inconsistent with betweenness.  
To sum up, the experimental studies frequently document an asymmetric split between 
quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences. However, a modal choice is inconsistent with 
betweenness only in few lottery pairs. Such empirical evidence has been accepted initially as a 
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strong support for frequent violations of betweenness (e.g., Camerer, 1992). Section 3 shows that 
this experimental evidence is actually consistent with stochastic betweenness theories. 
Noteworthy, the concept of stochastic utility was formalized only in the mid 1990’s i.e. after the 
wave of experimental tests of betweenness.  
3. A reexamination of experimental methodology 
All experimental studies mentioned in section 2 employ the same method to test for 
betweenness violations. An experimenter determines two lotteries 1L  and 2L  and asks an 
individual to choose one lottery from three sets: { }21 , LL , { }ML ,1  and { }ML ,2 , where 
( ) 21 1 LLM αα −+= , ( )1,0∈α . Earlier studies typically consider only the first and the second 
pairwise choices. If a probability mixture M is frequently (almost never) chosen in the second 
and third pairwise choices this is interpreted as an evidence of quasiconcave (quasiconvex) 
preferences. 
Harless and Camerer (1994), Hey and Orme (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1995) 
propose different ways of incorporating a stochastic element into deterministic decision theories. 
The following argument is built upon a more general stochastic specification that is consistent 
with the stochastic specifications of Hey and Orme (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1995) but 
not with Harless and Camerer (1994). Harless and Camerer (1994) p. 1261 propose a constant 
choice-independent error rate. Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that this stochastic specification 
generally fits the data poorly. Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) 
propose an additive, normally distributed error term on the utility scale. Loomes and Sugden 
(1995) argue that random errors directly affect a preference relation of an individual rather than 
an individual’s utility of lotteries. 
 5
Consider the true (unobservable) preference of an individual that is governed by 
betweenness axiom. According to this underlying preference, probability mixture M is located 
between lotteries 1L  and 2L  in terms of an individual’s utility. An individual’s actual (observed) 
choice is obscured by random errors. Lotteries 1L  and 2L  are more distinct in terms of utility 
than lotteries M and 1L  ( 2L ), unless an individual happens to be exactly indifferent between 1L  
and 2L . Therefore, the impact of random errors is more significant in a binary choice between M 
and 1L  ( 2L ) than in a binary choice between 1L  and 2L . In terms of the approach of Loomes and 
Sugden (1995), the strength of an individual’s preference relation is greater in a pairwise choice 
between 1L  and 2L  than in a pairwise choice between M and 1L  ( 2L ).  
A stochastic betweenness axiom implies relation (1) where ∗  stands for ≥<=> ,,,  or ≤ .  
( ) ( )( ) 5.0Prob
Prob
Prob
1
2
21 ∗∗ ML
LM
LL f
ff      (1) 
If an individual respects stochastic betweenness, a choice pattern when M is chosen either from 
the set { }ML ,1  or from the set { }ML ,2  (but not from both) should be a modal (most frequent) 
choice pattern. Additionally, if ( ) ( )MLLM ff 12 ProbProb > , M is more frequently chosen 
from the sets { }ML ,1  and { }ML ,2 , which appears as if the evidence of quasiconcave 
preferences. If ( ) ( )MLLM ff 12 ProbProb < , M is less frequently chosen from the sets { }ML ,1  
and { }ML ,2 , which appears as if the evidence of quasiconvex preferences. However, both of 
these choice pattern are consistent with stochastic betweenness that does not impose any 
restrictions on the relationship between ( )2Prob LM f  and ( )ML f1Prob .  
For illustration, consider two lotteries 1L  and 2L  that are sufficiently distinct in terms of 
an individual’s utility in the sense that a random error seldom reverses a true preference 21 LL f  
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so that ( )21Prob LL f  is close to unity. Suppose that a probability mixture M is not sufficiently 
distinct from either lottery 1L  or 2L  in terms of an individual’s utility. An occasional random 
error can reverse the true underlying preference ML f1  and 2LM f . Furthermore, let us 
assume that a mixture M is closer to lottery 2L  than to lottery 1L  in terms of an individual’s 
utility. Thus, a random error obscures more frequently preference 2LM f  rather than ML f1 . 
In other words, ( )2Prob LM f  is closer to a chance performance (50%) than ( )ML f1Prob .  In 
terms of the approach of Loomes and Sugden (1995), an individual’s preference 21 LL f  is 
stronger than the preference ML f1 , which in its turn is stronger than the preference 2LM f . 
For examples, if ( ) 99.0Prob 21 =LL f , ( ) 89.0Prob 1 =ML f  and ( ) 73.0Prob 2 =LM f , the 
above experimental procedure reveals that an individual apparently respects betweenness with 
probability 65%, apparently has quasiconvex preferences with probability 24% and apparently 
has concave preferences with probability 8%.  
However, it is misleading to interpret these results as a systematic violation of 
betweenness. Camerer and Ho (1994) p.176 find a similar asymmetric split between quasiconvex 
and quasiconcave preferences and conclude that “betweenness is clearly violated”. However, 
when Camerer and Ho fit different stochastic theories to the same dataset, a disappointment 
aversion theory (e.g., Gul, 1991), which is a betweenness theory, accommodates data better than 
cumulative prospect theory, which violates betweenness (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
An asymmetric pattern of betweenness violations arises because lotteries 1L , 2L  and M 
are not equally spaced in terms of an individual’s utility (e.g., Hey and Orme, 1994) or, 
alternatively, the strength of an individual’s preference between lotteries 1L , 2L  and M is not 
uniform (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1995). Therefore, for some lottery pairs random errors 
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obscure an elicited preference relation more severely than for the others. Persuasive evidence of 
systematic violations of betweenness would have been an asymmetric split between quasiconvex 
and quasiconcave preferences when betweenness is not a modal choice pattern. However, as 
mentioned in section 2, such violations are rare. 
If an asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is caused by 
random errors, the observed violations of betweenness are likely to be more symmetric for 
mixtures with α  close to 0.5 and they are likely to be highly asymmetric with α  close to 0 or 1. 
This prediction is confirmed by experimental evidence. A highly asymmetric split between 
quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences reported in Prelec (1990) and Camerer and Ho (1994) 
(triple “TUV”) is elicited for 171=α , in Bernasconi (1994)—for 05.0=α  and 95.0=α . 
4. Conclusions 
A reexamination of experimental methodology used in the studies allegedly documenting 
systematic violations of betweenness demonstrates that the existing evidence is consistent with a 
stochastic betweenness i.e. the individuals appear to obey betweenness with random errors. On 
its own, the asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is not a 
sufficient evidence of violations of stochastic betweenness unless quasiconvex or quasiconcave 
preferences are revealed as a modal choice. The later case, however, is documented rarely in the 
experimental studies. The asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences 
can be generated by random errors whose impact is less severe for lotteries that are more distinct 
in terms of an individual’s utility. This result explains an apparent puzzle mentioned by Camerer 
and Ho (1994) why a stochastic betweenness theory (disappointment aversion theory) fits best in 
5 out of 11 experimental studies and outperforms the cumulative prospect theory although its 
main building block—a deterministic betweenness axiom—is apparently violated.  
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